

Chapter 2: Sociological explanations for the gender gap

In his 1989 book *Revolving Doors*, Jerry Jacobs argues that while childhood socialization is important in shaping decisions about where one will work, it is not a straitjacket on women's choices of occupations, but must be reinforced by adult experiences at school and in the workplace that reiterate gender-role specific attitudes and behaviors. Because Jacobs gives due weight to the power of gender socialization to shape choices about where one will work, while also arguing that hostile workplace cultures and behaviors shape women's job decisions, his book is worth quoting at some length.

Various theories of socialization stress different psychological mechanisms and different influences on the young. [One such is the argument that] socialization instills in girls a sensitivity to family obligations and a feminine value orientation. Women are taught from a young age that their primary role will be the maternal one, which reduces their commitment to lifelong employment. They choose jobs with flexible schedules and opportunities to express feminine values such as nurturance. As a result, women pursue a limited set of occupations, such as clerical work, teaching, social work, and nursing, that allow them to realize these values. Boys are taught to be competitive, to strive to achieve, and to expect no tension between work and family commitments. They consequently seek out a wider range of careers than girls and devote themselves more completely to the pursuit of success... [But this thesis also holds that] socialization leads some young women to prefer employment in male-dominated occupations. If traditional aspirations channel women into female-dominated occupations, women who break out of this traditional mold should be found in male-dominated occupations. [Identifying] factors associated with increased preference for employment in male-dominated occupations is thus an important line of inquiry for the socialization perspective... But even if socialization were a powerful predictor of the sex type of women's first jobs, substantial career mobility between male-dominated and female-dominated occupations would vitiate the impact of socialization (Jacobs, 1989, 88-90).

...a very sizable minority of women are employed in male-dominated occupations at some point in their early years in the labor force (44 percent); and an even larger proportion aspire to work in a male-dominated occupation at one time to another (49 percent). Women's cumulative chances of employment in male-dominated occupations are slightly lower than their chances of aspiring to men's jobs. At the other end of the spectrum, female-dominated occupations at some point are desired by or employ the overwhelming majority of women (92 percent and 93 percent, respectively).

One reading of these results is that they speak to the power of sex-role socialization. They indicate that few women are able to escape its spell at some point. Nearly all women at one point or another aspire to a female-dominated occupation. Thus socialization is important in this early stage of life: the evidence demonstrates the prevalence of social influences.

However, the continuity between life stages is weaker than many suspect. These results indicate that the serial correlation in the sex-type of occupations is quite weak, not

only for occupation changers, but for the sample as a whole; most women are likely to have expressed interest in sex-neutral or male-dominated occupations at some point. Indeed, many women have had some employment experience in sex-neutral and male-dominated occupations. If all of the women who ever aspired to or were employed in male-dominated occupations remained in them, sex segregation would be far less severe than it is. Thus, sex-role socialization, while a powerful force in influencing attitudes and behavior, needs continuing reinforcement and support to be effective in channeling young women into female-dominated occupations.... Sex segregation persists into adulthood because sex-appropriate attitudes and behavior are reinforced in the educational and occupational settings. Thus, social control is not so tight as to preclude mobility, nor does its effectiveness increase over the life course. Rather, it is an enduring and imperfect set of influences that allow a notable degree of mobility in both directions while maintaining the overall system of segregation (Jacobs, 1989, 101, 103-4).

Some (especially economists) have argued that differences in human capital help explain why women and men end up in sex-segregated jobs. Thus, women generally acquire a different set of human capital than men, observable in different percentages of women who complete high school, some college, get a BA, differences in the majors they pursue in college, whether they acquire licenses or professional degrees or other post-graduate education, etc. If women's human capital is different and less valuable in the job market than men's, that would help explain gender gaps in earnings. But Jacobs is inclined to doubt this explanation too:

Economists assume that stable differences in values lead men into male-dominated occupations and women into female-dominated occupations. But the data suggest otherwise. Individuals report frequent changes in intentions, and thus a central premise of the economic perspective is undermined. Moreover, the career mobility into and out of male-dominated occupations is particularly problematic from the standpoint of the human capital approach. If there were a steep human-capital gradient such that male-dominated occupations required higher levels of investment than female-dominated occupations, individuals would find it difficult to move into male-dominated jobs, and they would find little reason to move out of such jobs. The extensive mobility documented in both directions suggests that a human-capital differential is not the principal force responsible for the sex segregation of occupations [citation omitted].

[Rather,] the evidence is consistent with a lifelong social control perspective, which emphasizes the continuous if imperfect social control mechanisms that operate to maintain the sex segregation of occupations. Socialization tracks young men and women into different career paths, but these differences are unstable without continuing social controls. Individuals can and do change direction, but the cumulative force of sex-role reinforcement reproduces sex segregation during the early labor force years. The system as a whole remains segregated even while individuals change their goals and plans (Jacobs, 1989, 106-7).

The long term stability of sex segregation cannot be attributed to the labor supply characteristics of women. Sex segregation cannot be pinned on the stable attributes

individuals bring with them to the labor market, because these attributes are less stable than assumed, both before and after labor market entry. The short-term instability of individuals' behavior and its responsiveness to labor force trends and the social climate are strong evidence against this perspective. These findings suggest that as discrimination is relaxed, women are more than willing to move into a broad range of occupational roles from which they had previously been excluded. This evidence suggests that it is not the lack of interest or "taste" for work in male-dominated occupations that is the cause of women's underrepresentation (Jacobs, 1989, 169-70).

The following section focuses on women's experiences in the male-dominated work force that cause them to leave male-dominated occupations. These experiences include sexual harassment, lacking of welcoming environment and acceptance, and fewer opportunities than their male counterparts. Women face these barriers because many men in male-dominated jobs want to preserve the male camaraderie of the workplace, especially in blue-collar jobs which men see the masculinity in the occupation as rewarding. Interestingly, Jacobs does not think work-family conflict is an important explanation for the mobility patterns he observes.

During the labor market years, sex segregation is not simply the product of institutional barriers women face but rather is the result of a dynamic process. Women have difficulty getting hired in male-dominated occupations, getting the assistance they need to learn the ropes, and getting the recognition they deserve for the work they do. Kanter (1977), for example, has argued that minority status per se creates a host of problems for women, including systematic misperception by the majority, a lack of political allies, and difficulties in winning acceptance from peers and subordinates. Thus, the barriers to success for women in male-dominated occupations do not disappear once they have succeeded in being hired (Jacobs, 1989, 138).

Factors potentially affecting work commitment, including number and ages of children, weeks employed, and hours worked per week, were examined, and other background factors, such as region and urbanism, were studied. None of these variables dramatically altered the pattern of circulation described here [of women moving out of male-dominated jobs].... A high degree of sex-type mobility is evident among a broad spectrum of workers at all age levels and in a wide variety of employment settings.

These results indicate the generality of the patterns observed across different occupational settings and for working women with different attributes. For example, the results indicate that it is not simply women's conflict between work and family that is responsible for the mobility patterns observed... The sex-type mobility patterns we document are a prevalent, though little recognized, aspect of women's work experiences.... When harassment has the intent or effect of inhibiting women from entering male-dominated occupations or inducing them to leave, then harassment becomes a mechanism of social control that promotes sex segregation in the workplace. Along the internalized-coercive continuum, harassment falls at the coercive extreme. If some women leave male-dominated occupations as a result of harassment, this movement

constitutes self-selection, or, more specifically, differential persistence, but hardly the internalization of female norms. (Jacobs, 1989, 149-51)

The interest of women in entering male-dominated occupations is not difficult to explain; the exit of women from male-dominated occupations is the counter-intuitive result calling for an explanation. While discrimination in hiring undoubtedly is a major factor in restricting the access to women to male-dominated occupations, those women who succeed in obtaining such employment face a host of reminders on the job that they are less than welcome. A great deal has been written about the difficulties women face once they enter what were previously male bastions. Kanter (1977) makes a case for the role of proportions in general and token status in particular. We have seen continual pressure on women who seek to pursue male-dominated occupations, with attrition evident in the aspiration and education states as well as on the job.... We document a higher rate of occupation change for women in male-dominated occupations and show that women who leave a male-dominated occupation are unlikely to enter another male-dominated occupation.... Career experiences thus may be crucial in determining the career destinations of individual women and in perpetuating a stable system of segregation by sex. The revolving door pattern of movement between male-dominated and female-dominated occupations is the final stage in a lifelong system that serves to maintain the structure of occupational sex segregation (Jacobs, 1989, 166-7).

Jacobs does not limit his analysis of job mobility to women who participate in blue-collar workplaces; his discussion of doctors and lawyers offers brief case studies that support a similar pattern of mobility in elite white collar professions. Jacobs notes that women who enter these high-status male dominated professions often change their specialty (18% of MDs changed their primary specialty, 159-60), or in the case of lawyers, were blocked from attaining partner roles with high status legal firms, or were discouraged by encounters with judges, opposing counsel, courtroom staff and administrative personnel (163-4). Thus he writes:

Liefland (1986) reports that 11.2 percent of women reported discrimination as one of the reasons they left their first law jobs. A minority of women associates continue to report that men are given more “choice” assignments and more responsibility, leading to greater prospects for advancement (Winter, 1983). Thus, the most male-dominated and most lucrative centers of the legal profession – the large corporate firms – maintain their male dominance by inducing the selective attrition of female associates (Jacobs, 1989, 163).¹

In contrast to Jacobs, who studies *women's* experiences at work, Michelle Budig and Paula England argue in their 2001 article “The Wage Penalty of Motherhood” that work place discrimination against *mothers* could be a reason why they earn lower wages than their childless counterparts. They think one of the main causes of the motherhood penalty may be that mothers choose to work part time, as they have fewer opportunities to find fulfilling full time jobs with upward mobility and flexible schedules.

[A] possible explanation of the motherhood penalty is employer discrimination--treating women differently because of their motherhood status... Such discrimination is distinct from sex discrimination that is based on the probabilistic assumption that most women are or will become mothers. Sex discrimination creates a sex gap in pay, but not a gap between mothers and other women.

Economists distinguish between discrimination based on "taste" and on statistical discrimination. In the taste model, an employer makes no assumption about mothers' lesser productivity but simply finds it distasteful to employ them. Sometimes it is co-workers or customers who have this taste, and employers find it expensive to offend them. If such differential treatment of mothers exists, it should show up in our models as a residual effect of motherhood after human capital and the mother-friendliness of jobs have been controlled. (Of course *prior* discrimination could affect the accumulation of experience, encouraging labor force withdrawals.) Or if some of the motherhood penalty is reduced by controlling for job characteristics that determine reward level, discrimination could explain why mothers were relegated to lower paying jobs; in this case discrimination could explain more than just the residual penalty after controlling for job characteristics.

A second discrimination model is statistical discrimination. Suppose that, net of types of human capital that employers can screen cheaply, such as education and experience, mothers are, on average, less productive. The statistical discrimination model is part of economists' consideration of costs of information. The idea is that it is expensive to measure individual productivity before hiring, so employers use averages based on in-formal or formal data gathering to predict how individuals will perform. On this basis, they might treat women with (more) children less favorably. In economists' thinking, employers would create the degree of pay gap between mothers and non-mothers (or any other two groups to whom statistical discrimination applies) that is commensurate with their estimated productivity gap. In most statistical discrimination models offered by economists, the group that is discriminated against is paid, on average, approximately commensurate with the groups' average productivity; in taste discrimination the group's average pay is less than that based on their average productivity. Of course, in such a scheme, individual mothers who are more productive than the average mother are being paid less than commensurate with their productivity....

U.S. federal law prohibits sex and race discrimination in two forms. Differential treatment involves treating women differently than men because of their sex rather than any individual qualification. This standard prohibits both taste and statistical discrimination. U.S. law, however, does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on parenthood status, but if differential treatment on the basis of parenthood were applied only to women, the courts might well see such treatment as sex discrimination, provided that qualifications and productivity were equivalent between the groups of women.

A second kind of legal claim of sex or race discrimination involves *disparate impact*. This doctrine states that policies are considered discriminatory and illegal if they use some screening criterion for hiring or promotion that screens out more women than men *and* the screening criterion is not a "business necessity." "Business necessity" is defined loosely to include anything that results in more productive workers or reduces costs. Consider the analogous concept of business policies that have a disparate impact on

mothers: Policies that require long or inflexible work hours, do not allow sick days to care for children, do not permit personal phone calls from the job, and do not provide for maternity leave will adversely affect mothers. A disparate impact claim of discrimination against mothers parallel to the present legal standard regarding sex and race would prohibit any such policies, *unless* having such policies saves employers money or increases output. (Budig and England, 2001, 208-9, references omitted)

Although Budig and England consider how one might extend protections against sex-based discrimination to discrimination on the basis of motherhood, their focus is on demonstrating that having children in fact affects women's earnings. After all, unless that is scientifically demonstrable, demanding legal protections against discrimination on the basis of motherhood will make no headway. They consider several explanations for the maternal wage gap—whether it might be related to mothers trading

wages for "mother-friendly" jobs, or [whether] lowered productivity could cause women to choose less demanding jobs. Or job characteristics could explain the motherhood penalty if employers discriminated against mothers, excluding them from high-paying jobs with demands they believed mothers would fulfill less well... [But support] for these ideas is weak. Including all the job characteristics lowers the (marital status- and human capital-adjusted) penalty for each child from -.047 to -.037. Although this is a 21-percent reduction, a decline in the child penalty to wages from about 5 percent to about 4 percent seems small. The reduction in the OLS model is even smaller. Moreover, half of the reduction in the fixed-effects model is achieved by simply including a single job characteristic: whether the woman is working part-time. Working part-time reduces hourly pay, either directly or through forcing women into less desirable jobs that offer part-time hours.

No other job characteristic, when added alone to the human capital model, changes the child penalty to any nontrivial extent... Mothers are less likely to be in jobs involving authority and more likely to work in jobs involving child care. But neither of these variables, when added to the model, reduces the child penalty by even one percentage point. Controlling for the sex composition of the woman's job had no effect on the child penalty. Although "female" jobs pay less, mothers are no more likely than non-mothers to be in them. In fact, the zero-order correlation between number of children and the percent female of one's job is slightly negative. Thus, there is no evidence that women select female jobs because they are more mother-friendly. (Budig and England, 2001, 214-216)

Even though job characteristics other than working part time made no difference in the motherhood penalty, Budig and England did find that motherhood and human capital were connected: the data they present in Table 2 show "that reduced experience is clearly part of the explanation of the motherhood penalty. Controlling for the human capital variables ... reduces the child penalty by 36 percent, from about 7 percent to 5 percent" (Budig and England, 2001, 214).

Marriage seems to slightly increase the child penalty, as "women who have never been married experience lower child penalties than do married or divorced women." They continue:

The fact that marriage increases the child penalty suggests that at least some part of the penalty arises because the ratio of time and energy mothers allocate to children versus jobs is affected by whether they have a source of financial support other than their own earnings. Without assuming a sex-based division of labor, the direction we would predict for this interaction would not be clear. Husbands could, in principle, provide money that allows married mothers to focus more on their children than single women can; or they could simply be a second person to share child-care responsibilities, allowing married mothers to focus more on their jobs than single mothers. The higher child penalty for married mothers suggests that the first scenario is more common....

It is puzzling that married and divorced women have similarly high child penalties. After all, divorced women do not have husbands to provide financial support and they usually get relatively little child support. The similarity implies that the larger penalties experienced by married women are long-lasting, enduring even if the marriage ends. Perhaps the penalties operate through missed promotions, or cumulative impacts of impressions made, or small raises earned early in one's employment history (Budig and England, 2001, 218).

Budig and England conclude their article by reiterating their findings and commenting on the ways that the motherhood penalty increases with each child born, and is related to employment breaks, accumulating fewer years of experience and seniority, and part time employment:

We find a wage penalty for motherhood of approximately 7 percent per child among young American women. Roughly one-third of the penalty is explained by years of past job experience and seniority, including whether past work was part-time. That is, for some women, motherhood leads to employment breaks, part-time employment, and the accumulation of fewer years of experience and seniority, all of which diminish future earnings. However, it is striking that about two-thirds of the child penalty remains after controlling for elaborate measures of work experience.

We added numerous job characteristics to models to assess whether mothers earn less because their jobs are less demanding or because they offer mother-friendly characteristics. These factors had only a small effect in explaining the child penalty, and about half of the effect came from a single job characteristic--whether the current job is part-time. Most job characteristics had no effect on the motherhood penalty--either because the characteristics don't affect pay or because motherhood does not affect whether women hold these jobs (Budig and England, 2001, 219-20).

Although sex segregation is prominent in the work place and many women are congregated in female-dominated or part-time occupations, in his 2004 article "The Gender Division of Labor" Philip Cohen points out that the most gender-segregated occupation is that of houseworker (more normally we use the nomenclature "housewife"), which because it is not a paid job is not typically counted as an "occupation" at all. To minimize the overall gender segregation in occupations, Cohen thinks women will have to leave the "houseworker" occupation and enter other occupations.

With women more likely to be employed, the segregation of paid work has increased in importance as a component of gender inequality. Chang (2000, 1658) argued that "the long-standing presumption has been that occupations are the back-bone of the class stratification system, but as women enter into the formal economy in ever-increasing numbers, the occupational structure becomes the main locus of gender stratification as well." This echoes an earlier body of research on the shift from home to market, which stressed the continuity of gender segregation in the new context of the labor market:

The sexual division of labor reappears in the labor market, where women work at women's jobs, often the very jobs they used to do only at home....As these jobs are low-status and low-paying, patriarchal relations remain intact, though their material base shifts somewhat from the family to the wage differential, from family-based to industrially-based patriarchy. (Hartmann 1981, 25)

There clearly is a connection between the work women do at home and the occupations that are female dominated in the labor market. However, it is misleading to collapse the two entirely because there are very few paid occupations that are as female dominated as "women's work" in the home....

Thus, many researchers concerned with gender inequality have moved to focus primarily on occupational inequality, even as most feminists stress the continuity in the division of labor between home and market (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Cotter et al. 1997). But the transition from unpaid labor at home to paid labor in the market is itself a source of change in the gender division of labor. Direct comparisons are difficult to find, but consider the examples of cooking and cleaning. In 1995, women did 74 percent of all unpaid cooking at home, but in the market, only 45 percent of all cooks were women (this category excludes those working in private households, a tiny fraction of the total). Similarly, women did 80 percent of unpaid housecleaning at home, but only 35 percent of janitors and cleaners were women. Insofar as the division of labor is a cornerstone of gender inequality, then, women leaving home and going to work may itself reduce gender inequality. In fact, the market's ability to pull women from the household (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2001) has been a leading factor in the partial redivision of housework in the past few decades. This may be seen in the many studies that show less gender inequality in couples' housework when women are employed (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Bianchi et al. 2000; Coltrane 2000). (Cohen, 240-241)

Summarizing his main point about the importance of considering unpaid housework as an occupation when we think about gender stratification in the workforce, Cohen writes:

...we need to take housework into account when tracking the overall gender division of labor--including both paid and unpaid work... The results show that the inclusion of houseworkers as an occupation affects measures of gender segregation in two ways. First, because the houseworker occupation is large and predominantly female, estimates of gender segregation are higher when these women are included. Second, because women entering the formal labor force are on average entering occupations that are less segregated than housework, the rate of decline in gender segregation is somewhat steeper over the period once houseworkers are included. However, the outcome is not a simple

one, because former houseworkers move into more segregated occupations than women who are already in the labor market and because some women reenter the houseworker occupation when they leave the paid labor force. Finally, a decomposition of the trends shows that, over time, women leaving housework as an occupation contributed as much to the overall decline in gender segregation as did the desegregation of paid occupations. (Cohen, 249-250)

If we attend to unpaid housework as an occupation, then the degree of gender stratification in the labor market is higher than if we only look at paid jobs, and the movement toward gender equal organization of work is greater too. Cohen essentially is urging us not to forget that unpaid work is socially important work and part of the overall structure of the labor force, a particularly important reminder in an economy where women who go outside the home to work often have to hire other women to take care of tasks that they used to do as unpaid "houseworkers," like caring for children, doing laundry, house cleaning, and cooking.

Whereas Jacobs, Budig and England, and Cohen all focus on the pattern of women earning less than men and explanations for gender stratification in the workforce, Mariko Chang takes a different approach in her 2000 article "The Evolution of Sex Segregation Regimes." Rather than attending to explanations for individuals' decisions or behaviors--such as early childhood socialization, chilly workplace climates, and women's responsibility for unpaid childrearing and housework)--Chang connects sex segregation in the labor force to governmental regimes and state interventions. Her research shows how different types of government provisions or laws (e.g., anti-discrimination and affirmative action laws, paid maternity leaves, subsidized child care) affect women's involvement in the work force. She begins by establishing the importance of occupational segregation by sex:

...occupational segregation affects the gender gap in earnings, the likelihood of career mobility, and the possibility of having some degree of autonomy over one's work or of exercising authority over the work of others (see Reskin [1993] for a review).

Even when segregation is less consequential for occupation-related rewards, such as earnings or prestige, occupational segregation is in and of itself consequential for women's socioeconomic status. First of all, jobs filled primarily by women have a tendency to become ghettoized (Reskin and Roos 1990). Second, if women choose occupations based on family considerations or if a large presence of women in an occupation renders that occupation more "friendly" to workers with family responsibilities, then the concentration of women into these types of occupations may reinforce a gendered division of labor in which women's (but not men's) labor force decisions are disproportionately influenced by family and household responsibilities. Occupational sex segregation "may be a symptom and a cause of continuing gender inequality" (Rubery, Fagan, and Maier 1996, p. 431) (Chang, 2000, 1659).

I argue that to understand cross-national variation in patterns of occupational sex segregation one must recognize the institutional context within which these sex segregation regimes are embedded and the potential role of the state in mediating the

effects of market and family relations on women's economic status. The institutional environment clearly influences the nature of state intervention and the state's legal commitment to gender equality within the home and the workplace.

At the most abstract level, states have adopted two different approaches to issues of gender stratification: an interventionist approach in which they take an active role in shaping women's roles within the family and the formal economy, and a noninterventionist (or laissez-faire) approach in which they do not actively regulate women's role within the family or the labor force, thereby allowing other institutions (e.g., the family, the economy) to play a more dominant structuring role.

There are primarily two domains where state intervention into the nature of women's labor force participation is most likely to take place: (1) states can intervene in the public sphere by passing legislation that either promotes or inhibits women's access to participate in all occupations, and (2) states can intervene in the private sphere by taking over some of the responsibilities of the family, such as child care, or by supplementing the income of families with children. This first form of intervention concerns "equality of access" to all occupations, and the second concerns the availability of "substantive benefits" that facilitate the employment of women with family responsibilities.

Equality of access. – In the first form of interventionism, the state may attempt to enhance women's economic status by passing various laws that promote women's equality within the labor force. Equal pay and antidiscrimination laws help to affirm women's rights to participate in the labor force on the same terms as their male counterparts. By helping to eliminate discrimination based on gender, these laws should prevent employers from restricting entrance into occupations on the basis of sex and serve as the legal backbone for workers "demands" for equality. The strongest forms of such interventionism are proactive affirmative action policies that mandate a more equal representation of men and women across occupations.

While many equal opportunity and affirmative action laws are designed to open up opportunities for women in the labor market, state intervention also comes in the form of "protective" legislation, which inhibits women from doing certain types of work because it is deemed unsafe or otherwise unsuitable for women. Laws prohibiting women from "night work" and from working in underground mines are common examples of protective legislation (ILO 1987).

Substantive benefits. – A second form of state intervention is the provision of services for working mothers that facilitate the combination of work and motherhood. There is a wide variety of benefits of this type, with the most common being guaranteed maternity leave. Less common, but perhaps even more important, is state-subsidized child care. These policies should facilitate women's employment generally and help maintain the continuous and often full-time labor force participation deemed necessary for employees in many (often male-dominated) occupations.

I propose that cross-national variation in the nature of equal access and substantive benefits result in four distinct regimes of occupational sex segregation: formal-egalitarian, substantive-egalitarian, traditional family-centered, and economy-centered systems... (Chang, 2000, 1662-3)

The most common type of state intervention occurs in the form of legislation adopted to address gender inequality within the labor market. When opportunities for women are expanded via equal opportunity and affirmative action legislation, women are most likely to press for entrance into the more prestigious (and traditionally male-dominated) managerial and professional occupations because of the income, prestige, and autonomy associated with these occupations (Charles 1998) and because they are allocated on the basis of educational credentials rather than ascriptive criteria. As a result, I expect that countries with strong equal opportunity or affirmative action policies would experience desegregation within the professional and managerial occupations in particular. (Chang, 2000, 1667)

Whereas labor market interventions address economic inequality directly, substantive interventions take a more indirect approach to gendered labor market inequalities by providing services to working women that facilitate women's dual roles as workers and mothers. Despite efforts to minimize the tension between "home" and "work," segregation may actually increase with such substantive intervention because the expansion of services for working women can create female-typed jobs (Charles 1992; Esping-Andersen 1993; Hagen and Jenson 1988; Kolberg 1991). In this regard, one ironic by-product of the strong commitment to gender equality in substantive-egalitarian countries is that segregation increases as women flow into female-typed service jobs created by the differentiation of functions, such as child care, out of the family and into the formal economy. Despite the feminization of the service sector, gender-egalitarian ideology coupled with the availability of substantive services for working mothers should enable women to enter some male-dominated occupations, particularly the more prestigious administrative and managerial occupations (Chang, 2000, 1667-1668).

At the end of the day, Chang's insight is one that many others have also noted, that feminist claims in the United States have been oriented around equal treatment in the market, in the form of a strong regime of anti-discrimination laws and affirmative action policies. This approach is quite different than the demands feminists in Europe have commonly made for policies that facilitate being able to work and be responsible for childrearing (substantive supports like paid leaves and child care centers). The policy approach a government takes to addressing gender stratification in the workplace have consequences for the kinds of jobs women are able to access and keep, and if we want to understand these cross national patterns, focusing on the national policy level rather than the individual behavioral level is useful. We shall revisit policy options later, in chapter eight.

¹ Vicki Schultz, working in the same vein as Jacobs and reflecting on a major class action lawsuit alleging hiring patterns that discourage women from taking higher paying commission sales jobs (*EEOC v. Sears-Roebuck & Co.*, 1986), echoes his findings about the importance of women's on-the-job work experiences in shaping their tendency to move out of male-dominated occupations (Schultz, 1992).